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Abstract 
 
This paper provides an ethnographic understanding of harmony as language policy in 
China. We ground this understanding in a historical analysis of ‘harmony’ as a distinct 
traditional Chinese ideal that gradually finds its new expressions through policy in 
contemporary China. Based on this, we focus particularly on language practices 
surrounding ‘harmony’ that are emerging from the Internet, a discursive space and site of 
policing that is highly diverse while also heavily contested with respect to policing 
processes, and notably so in the context of the PRC for its stringent measures of 
censorship and sensitization to language use. From this perspective of the Internet in 
China, we show empirically that although the state is arguably the strongest stakeholder 
in implementing the policy of harmony – or, better, harmonization – the actual processes 
of harmonization through policing online develop in detailed, multidirectional and 
unpredictable rather than abstract, linear or monofocal ways. The outcomes of such 
processes are paradoxically alternative ideologies of harmony, as well as non-normative 
uses of language. The general implications to language policy are also discussed.  
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1. Introduction 
Whereas language policy at the state or institutional level generally aims for the ideal of 
harmony and social cohesion by emphasizing normativity and order, language practices 
embedded in everyday life at the ground level demonstrate far more features of 
divergence, heterogeneity and polycentricity. This is exceedingly so in view of the 
current stage of globalization and its outcome of ‘superdiversity’ (Vertovec 2006). The 
mediascapes, for instance, especially the Internet and digital communication, open up a 
new, unprecedentedly complex and less controllable space in which effects of formal 
policies are seen accompanied and, in many cases, de-centered and transformed by those 
of multiple agency in a variety of sociolinguistic settings (see e.g. Androutsopoulos 2006; 
Pietikäinen & Piirainen-Marsh 2009). This poses challenges to the question of how 
harmony is discursively negotiated and (co)constructed in and as social reality, as much 
as how language policy and perhaps society at large may be better conceptualized and 
understood when grounded in such reality. 
These observations are relevant to the current paper in two ways. On the one hand, they 
raise broad concerns about language policy research as theory and methodology, and they 
point us towards calls for a paradigmatic shift in this field (Ricento 2006; Shohamy 2006; 
McCarthy 2011): from a traditional focus on the formal policy (policy-as-text), often in 
the strict sense of the term, as a set of official documents, directives and regulations 
produced by authorities such as the state, to a Hymesian (1980, 1996) ethnographic 
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perspective on policy (policy-as-discourse) as dynamic, multifaceted and situated social 
practices. Following this perspective, and drawing on Foucault’s notion of police, 
disciplinary power and governmentality, Blommaert et al. (2009) further suggest that 
language policy should be seen in terms of processes of ‘policing’, i.e. processes of 
rational production and management of a normative structure that involves various social 
and political actors and institutions with unequally distributed agency. This locates 
language policy in complexes of ideology and webs of cultural meanings (Geertz 1973) 
and, as such, in constellations of micro discursive practices that are anchored in different 
and often conflictual ideologies, and are indexical and constitutive of the macro patterns 
of normativity and order. In such constellations, as argued by Blommaert and his 
colleagues, the state functions as but one of a wide range of possible centers of norms. 
On the other hand, the questions of harmony and language policy, which are central to 
this special issue, draw our attention to China as both a comparative context (to African 
and other contexts) and an interesting case in its own right. Harmony and language policy 
go hand in hand in China.  Evolving from a well-entrenched classical Confucian ideal, 
‘harmony’ has in recent years become a proper name that stands for the explicit discourse 
on the rationalization, maintenance and enforcement of stability and order by the state in 
reaction to the rapid economic-political changes and sociocultural diversifications 
resulting from the country’s modernization and globalization processes. This can be seen 
in the presently prevalent slogan of ‘Harmonious Society’ championed by President Hu 
Jintao. Not only the formal policy specific to language, which already advocates the 
monoglot ideology (Silverstein 1996), but almost all official policies in China, have 
adopted the state motif of ‘harmony’. This has huge impacts on the way language and 
communication ought to be and are actually practised in (at least) the public sphere in 
China, including in its newly emerging online environment, to ensure the kind of 
harmony as envisaged by the state. Harmony, therefore, is a crucial aspect and driving 
force of language policy and policing in the context of China. 
What we will explore in this paper is an ethnographic understanding of harmony via - and 
thus as - language policy in China, a topic largely under-researched. This will be 
grounded in a historical analysis of ‘harmony’ as a distinct traditional Chinese ideal that 
gradually finds its new expressions through policy in contemporary China. Based on this, 
we will focus particularly on language practices surrounding ‘harmony’ that are emerging 
from the Internet, a discursive space and site of policing that is, as mentioned earlier, 
highly diverse while also heavily contested with respect to policing processes, and 
notably so in the context of the PRC for its stringent measures of censorship and 
sensitization of language use (e.g. Tsui 2003; Zhou 2005; MacKinnon 2008; Yang 2009). 
From the perspective of the Internet, we will show empirically that although the state is 
arguably the strongest stakeholder in implementing the policy of harmony – or, better, 
harmonization – in the case of China, the actual processes of harmonization through 
policing online develop in detailed, multidirectional and unpredictable rather than 
abstract, linear or monofocal ways. The outcomes of such processes are, paradoxically, 
alternative ideologies of harmony as well as non-normative use of language. 
In what follows, we start with a consideration of the historicity of the discourse of 
harmony by examining, first, the Confucian traditions in which ‘harmony’ was 
4 
 
philosophized as a recognizable system of values and beliefs in Chinese society and, then, 
its recent development and reinvention into a dominant discourse of order in 
contemporary China. This is followed by an investigation of China’s state 
implementation of harmony on the Internet and its online discursive appropriation with 
its wider societal impact. In the final part of the paper, we discuss the implications of 
these observations in our understanding of harmony as language policy, with reference to 
China and Chinese. 
 
2. Harmony as a Confucian Ideal 
The word ‘harmony’ can find its origin in he (和 in classical Chinese), a word that 
automatically evokes the connotation of affirmative acceptance and balanced 
coordination, i.e. coherent, orderly arrangement, of different parts of a whole, such as in 
music or visual art. It also suggests a reasoned compromise or reconciliation between 
these different parts, which leads to a peaceful ‘agree-to-disagree’ situation with 
potentially constructive outcomes. As a lay term, he is well liked by Chinese people as 
one of the core symbols of their cultural essence, alongside words such as ‘fortune’, 
‘longevity’ and ‘double-happiness’. 
It is important to make clear at the onset that when we speak of harmony in a Chinese 
context, we should bear in mind that, unlike elsewhere, the use of the term conjures up a 
distinctive ideological load that is deeply seated in over two millennia of Chinese history 
and cultural tradition of Confucianism. Harmony is one of the central tenets of the 
Confucian system of ethical philosophy and political governmentality (cf. Yao 2000). 
The Confucian doctrines of he are incorporated by generations of Chinese in their ways 
of conceptualizing norms and orders that inform individual behaviours in relation to the 
moral self, the family, the state, and other levels of society. In this sense, he represents a 
specific set of historically enregistered and internalized discourses about what it is meant 
by harmony, why harmony is important and how to achieve it socially and politically. 
This is a crucial point for understanding the significance of harmony in terms of language 
policy in Chinese societies. 
Despite the voluminous work on Confucianism and its developments, he was rarely 
addressed as a focused topic of academic concern, at least not until very recently when 
‘harmony’ arose as a catchword from China and grew into a synonym, if not a 
representation, of Confucianism and Chinese traditions. Some of these recent writings, 
such as those of Chenyang Li (2006, 2008a, 2008b), pay specific attention to the 
traditional Confucian notion of harmony, thus offering a good basis for us to examine 
more closely the idea of he in its classical form. These writings take he as an 
ethicospiritual belief that is deeply rooted in the ancient Chinese perceptions of human-
centeredness in organizing social life and the whole of the cosmos, and as aspirations for 
social unity, peace and prosperity. 
Even though today he is invariably credited to Confucianism, its genesis predates 
Confucius (551–479 BC).  Li (2006), for instance, traces its existence back to as far as 
the earliest dynasties of Shang (16
th–11th century BC) and Zhou (1066–256 BC). Through 
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examining he in a range of classics by various schools of thoughts until the Confucian 
era, Li observes that the concept gradually evolved from its initial meaning of describing 
how different sounds or flavours respond to one another in ancient music and food rituals 
(see also Li 2008b), to an aesthetic, ethical, philosophical, political and metaphysical 
ideal that emphasizes and embraces harmony as the optimal way of constructing society 
and the world. Such ideas of he were elaborated and resonated in the writings of many 
thinkers and scholars, particularly during the Spring and Autumn period and the Warring 
States period (770–221 BC) when China was occupied by divided small kingdoms, and 
when Confucius and other philosophers of the time flourished in competing to forge an 
advanced vision of governance strategies that would lead to a utopian cosmological order 
of harmony. 
It is believed that Confucius was the first to bring together the scattered thoughts about 
harmony and placed he at the centre of his philosophy. The previously variegated ideas 
were quoted and appropriated by Confucius and his followers to promote their beliefs 
about the social and political significance of harmony. He was held as ‘the highest ideal’ 
(Li 2006: 588) of what was later to become Confucianism, one the most influential 
thoughts and cultural traditions in China (and other Asian-Confucian societies). 
What is interesting in Li’s discussions on he, and also of relevance to our concerns about 
harmony in this paper, are the distinctions between harmony and sameness and the 
dynamics between sameness and difference. Confucius famously made harmony a 
criterion for junzi (the real gentleman) in The Analects, the most known Confucian 
classics, arguing that junzi he er butong ，xiaoren tong er buhe, namely, ‘The junzi 
harmonizes but does not seek sameness, whereas [an unscrupulous man] seeks sameness 
but does not harmonize’ (Li 2006: 586). He er butong (harmony with distinction) is a 
popular saying people still use today to defend their stance and settle disputes. What is 
inscribed in these lines is the subtle differentiation between harmony and sameness, 
between valid harmony based on the acknowledgement of difference versus sameness, or 
invalid harmony, based on the diminishing of difference; it also states the moral-ethical 
categorizations – either a harmonious honourable man or a disharmonious low rascal – 
according to, not harmony as the end effect, but as a process leading to that effect in 
which the order of good and bad, appropriate and inappropriate is negotiated and 
established. 
For Li, such dynamics are crucial to the understanding of he. He does not equal tong 
(sameness), even though sameness is an important ingredient of harmony and must be 
valued and maintained ‘at an appropriate level’ (Li 2006: 590). Not any kind of sameness 
leads to harmony. In fact, Li contends that the Confucian belief of harmony rejects the 
‘over-presence’ of sameness and deems it as being in danger of imposing uniformity and, 
as a result, disharmony. Difference, on the other hand, is a precondition and cornerstone 
of harmony because he is essentially about the harmonious, i.e. appropriate, interplays of 
differences. This implies that harmony presupposes the entailment of difference-as-
tension and conflict, what Li calls ‘strife’ (see also Liu & Allinson 1988). Whether 
cooperative opposition (the preferred and more conducive way towards harmony for Li), 
or severe struggles, strife is the process through which harmony is negotiated and sought. 
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In this sense, ‘harmony is not only a state but, more importantly, a process, [and] 
disharmony is necessarily present during the process of harmonization’ (Li 2006: 592). 
Hence what Confucius had in mind with he entails ‘harmony’ (hexie 和谐), ‘peace’ 
(heping 和平) and ‘reconciliation’ (hejie 和解), an equilibrium that can only be 
acceptable and appropriate through the strife and harmonization of sameness and 
difference – managed diversity, so to speak. This includes the management of different 
roles and the knowledge of ‘ought-ness’ for one’s behaviours based on the roles one 
assumes in society, what is known as ‘rites’ or li (礼) in Confucianism. For Confucius, li 
is not only ceremonial rituals to be performed on specific occasions for specific 
functions. It is one of the five basic virtues (i.e. humanity, appropriateness, rite, wisdom, 
and trust) in the Confucian ethics, and is deemed the right way, ‘the way of humanity and 
the way of Heaven’ (Li 2006: 588), of behaving oneself as well as managing society. Li 
embodies a comprehensive system of routinized and internalized norms people engage 
with in their everyday social life. The realization of harmony needs to go through the 
‘rites of passage’, as indicated in Li’s analysis of five scale-levels on which harmony can 
be implemented according to li. 
Li (2008a) identifies five hierarchical but interrelated scale-levels on which harmony 
operates by cross-referring to The Analects and a few other Confucian classics. The 
elementary one is the individual-personal awareness and desire to self-cultivate one’s 
internal harmonization as a sense of morality, and this is the foundation of a moral 
society. Maintaining one’s own inner balance and harmony is not only a virtue for self-
interest, but also a moral duty to the keeping of order in society. The second level 
concerns ‘a nexus of human relationship’ (ibid: 429), or the Confucian notion of five 
major human/ethical relationships in which the individual self exists. This level requires a 
harmonious relationship – in accordance with li – between ruler and minister, between 
parent and child, between husband and wife, between siblings, and between friends. For 
instance, ‘[t]he father is to be caring, the son filial, the husband appropriate, the wife 
deferential, the elder brother gentle, and the younger brother respectful’ (ibid: 430). 
Harmony in family is essential for it fosters both personal and social harmony. The next 
level of Confucian harmony is to do with the governance politics of the state, i.e.  
‘governance with virtue’. The harmonious governance is to bring about order in society 
through the functioning of government officials rather than penal laws. The fourth level 
involves promoting harmony as peaceful coexistence beyond the state borders, in the 
world. And finally, at the most fundamental level, harmony is applicable as a universal 
law that is generated by the interactive process of balancing human, nature and society, a 
cosmological order as depicted in I Ching. Li emphasizes that harmony, in the classical 
Confucian sense, works as a metaphysical as well as a moral concept. It centers on 
human awareness and intervention at all five scale-levels, thus, is mediated, relational 
and dynamic. Its ultimate goal is to realize the ‘grand harmony’ (taihe 太和) throughout 
the cosmos, which in turn derives from harmony at the lower levels. 
Harmony, therefore, is carefully constructed as a normative complex in Confucianism 
that relies on the cultivation of virtues and maintenance of ethics. Its argument about 
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sameness and difference is ultimately one about societal diversity in which he serves as 
an early model of humanist ideal about how life should be organized at multiple levels in 
order to achieve desired balance and order. In the harmonization process towards 
diversity, differences and conflicts are controlled and regulated, mostly as strife between 
individuality and collectiveness. Appropriateness and order are central to this work of 
harmony. So is hierarchy, which, as we have seen, is bound to and maintained by the 
moral duty of loyalty, obedience and filial piety based on criteria such as age (the older 
above the younger), gender (the male above the female) and social ranking (the senior 
above the junior, the superior above the inferior) and so on. In fact, hierarchy is 
considered a pivotal tenet of Confucianism in addition to harmony (e.g. Buttery & Leung 
1998).  The two rely on and reinforce one another. 
Returning to our earlier discussions on police and policing, it is now not difficult to see 
that the Confucian ideal of harmony, especially with a long historical trajectory of being 
the state-sponsored political and ethical system since Emperor Han Wudi’s rule (156–87 
BC), can serve as a coercive force that impacts on people’s perceptions about ‘how to be’ 
or ‘how to act’ and the normative organization of society in a Chinese context. This ideal, 
as we will see in the next section, has been intertextualized, updated and reinvented – 
eventually, established as policy – so as to fit in with the development of a modern China.  
 
3. The Reinvention of Harmony 
As already pointed out, ‘harmony’, or hexie (和谐, in modern Chinese), has recently 
become a visible pattern of political discourse in China, embodied in pervasive phrases 
like ‘Harmonious Society’ which are initiated by the Chinese government and constitute 
a striking feature of the new discursive order. If one travels to China nowadays, one 
would expect to find the overwhelming presence of the word hexie in the public sphere: 
on the TV, in newspapers, on public transport, in classrooms and offices, and on street 
billboards and banners. Blommaert’s (2010: 142-144) insightful account of the 
‘harmonious golf’ sign in a street in Beijing, about how the national political slogan of 
harmony is superimposed onto the global corporate discourse of golf, offers a 
representative example. 
As a matter of fact, this is an arduous comeback of Confucianism after being largely 
marginalized in China, its own center, since the beginning of the 20
th
 century. This return 
signals a discursive shift that centers upon the Confucian ‘jargon’ of harmony, the 
revamping and redeploying of which reflect the state attempts to establish new orders as 
its engagement with globalization processes deepens. Harmony, thus, becomes a strong 
contemporary rhetoric that dominates the discursive order of meaning making, as seen, 
for instance, in the official policy of ‘language harmony’ or yuyan hexie (语言和谐).  
Our concern with the discourse of harmony in China’s language policy certainly will 
benefit from an understanding of the philosophical-epistemic dimension of he as 
primarily conceived in the Confucian traditions, something we have examined in detail in 
the previous section; but, in the same way as the example of ‘harmonious golf’, this 
8 
 
concern also needs to be situated in the latest framework of talking and behaving, a 
framework under the name of hexie, that is emerging from the processes of globalization. 
To establish this framework is to investigate the social-historical dimension of hexie in 
which harmony is not only a historically conditioned and social reproduced discourse, but 
also a discursive feature of wider processes of social and political changes closely 
connected to globalization in China. We will see that hexie involves considerable 
discursive shifts, not just a reactivation of he. 
 
3.1  New Confucianism 
To be sure, the discursive shifts of hexie are by no means random. Yet, this only becomes 
clear when we consider it as one of the series of turbulent shifts in discourses about 
Confucianism that took place in China over the course of last century. Prior to that, 
Confucianism stayed more or less as a stable, mainstream system of value in an enclosed 
Chinese society ever since the Han Dynasty. The downfall of the last monarchy of Qing 
and the incoming of Western ideologies such as capitalism, liberalism and communism in 
the early 1900s witnessed the death of the concrete embodiment of the orthodoxy of 
Confucianism in China. A new generation of intellectuals emerging from the May Fourth 
movement (circa 1919) denounced the oppressive hegemony that centuries of political 
manipulations of Confucianism had exerted, especially over the equality, freedom and 
creativity of women and youth. On the other hand, a total breakaway and disregard of 
Confucianism, at least of its emblematic and intellectual values, also proved a devastating 
identity dilemma for a new nation-state at its moment of birth. In fact, Confucianism was 
never really off the scene. As Dirlik (1995: 234) asserts, ‘These same intellectuals [who 
argued against Confucianism] would, in ensuing years, engage in efforts to find some 
reconciliation between “Western” and “Chinese” values, out of which would emerge 
what has come to be called “New Confucianism”’. 
New Confucianism is an umbrella term that captures the ongoing movement of the neo-
conservative transformation and reinvention of the Confucian traditions since the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century, of which three generations (1921-1949, 1950-1979 and 
1980-present) of exponents have developed (Bresciani 2001; Liu 2003; Makeham 2003; 
Fan 2011). Over each of these three periods, the status, focus and impact of 
Confucianism shifted with the economic and political climate change at the time (see 
Dirlik 1995; Yao 2000; Bell 2006, 2010 and Louie 1980, 2011 for various discussions). 
To put it in a nutshell, the first generation of the three returned to Confucianism in 
searching for a sense of self from within a crisis-ridden China, amidst desires to depart 
from its condemned ‘feudal’ past. The second one was led by scholars outside Mainland 
China which was then occupied by the Cultural Revolution and a drastic ideological 
alienation from Confucianism in favour of Maoist communism and nationalism. This 
period was engaged mainly in a dialogue between the Oriental-Chinese Confucianism 
with the Western-Kantian philosophy. And the most recent decades saw a pan-China 
‘rediscovery’ of Confucianism (Bell 2006) accompanying the East Asian economic 
booms in the 1980s as – not so much its content, but – ‘the evaluation of that content 
with respect to the question of modernity’ had changed (Dirlik 1995: 236, our emphasis). 
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In this newest wave of Confucianism, China reemerged as its center and leading advocate 
in full swing, as it embarked on the post-Mao ‘reform and opening-up’ course in order to 
reengage with the wider globalization processes. It is this third phase of what is termed a 
‘renaissance’ of Confucianism (Little & Reed 1989; Fan 2011) that gives rise to the 
political discourse of harmony. 
 
3.2  The Harmonious Society 
China’s reengagment with globalization since 1979 has hugely enhanced the country’s 
economic-political power and, consequently, its social diversification and restratification. 
China joined the World Trade Organization in 2001, and in merely 10 years, its GDP had 
increased almost five times and it was ranked the second-largest economy in the world. 
Yet, the inequality of wealth is widening at an alarming speed, with its Gini coefficient 
index reaching 0.47 in 2010
1
. Reclaiming and revaluing Confucianism, under such 
conditions, becomes once again necessary and all the more important. On the one hand, it 
reasserts the part of the cultural and national identity that China had been alienated from 
under the dominance of western ideologies and self-inflicted disruptions. On the other 
hand, this re-forges a domestic political-ideological framework that can appeal to 
nationalistic nostalgia and, at the same time, reestablish order to a rapidly changing and 
restructuring society. It is in such a context that the Chinese government initiated the 
current wave of New Confucianism – what Wang (2011) describes as a more politically 
oriented Mainland China New Confucianism – by reintroducing hexie as the spearhead 
jargon that calls into question the need of new orders which is legitimized by the reuse of 
Confucianism. 
‘Harmonious Society’ or hexie shehui (和谐社会) was first put forth in September 2004, 
when President Hu Jintao made an important speech on ‘building a harmonious socialist 
society’ at the fourth plenary session of the Sixteenth Central Committee of the 
Communist Party of China. This was propounded in the following year, at CPC’s sixth 
plenary session which passed the strategic document ‘Chinese Communist Party Central 
Committee’s Resolution on Major Issues of Building a Socialist Harmonious Society’. 
According to President Hu, a harmonious society is ‘a scientific development concept’ 
which consists of six elements: democratic rule of law, fairness and justness, honesty and 
friendliness, vitality and liveliness, stability and orderliness, and coexistence of man and 
nature. It is urged that a harmonious, in other words, orderly, political environment and 
social structure with regained morale are needed in China to deal with the deepening 
social divide, discontents and tensions as well as to fill the perceived ideological and 
‘moral vacuum’ left by the Cultural revolution (Louie 2011).  
‘Harmonious Society’ can be taken as a real effort in building a culturalist/humanist 
image of the state by re-cherishing the core Chinese values as encoded in the Confucian 
                                                          
1 The Gini coefficient index measures income inequality, with < 0.25 generally considered the most 
equal and > 0.6 the most unequal; 0.4 is the internationally recognized warning line. See China Daily 
report Country’s Wealth Divide Past Warning Level at www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-
05/12/content_9837073.htm, last viewed on 9 April 2012. 
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concept of hexie while turning it into a new rhetoric ‘to react and redress an increasingly 
less balanced and less fair domestic landscape’ (Yu 2008:123) and, ultimately, to reassert 
the state authority. In such a context, hexie becomes a metonym for a self-defendable 
form of power and coercion that can be used to impose certain order and normativity. The 
recentering of harmony is reflected, implicitly or explicitly, in the way language policy in 
China has been (re)formulated and expanded over the past decade or so, gradually 
incorporating hexie as the main trope and motif.   
 
3.3 Language Harmony 
The monoglot standard of Putonghua and its hegemonic dominance over other varieties 
of Chinese has evolved out of sociohistorical practices (e.g. Dong 2010), and can thus be 
seen as a continual process of harmonization in the sense of Confucianism. The 
hierarchical order as harmony in the domain of language is made transparent and 
justifiable as it merges with the political discourse of social harmony in recent years. This 
is illustrated in the official poster used in 2009 (see Figure 1) for the 12
th
 annual National 
Putonghua Promotion Week organized by the Chinese National Commission on 
Language and Script Work, in which the layers of significance of harmony is inscribed in: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1:‘harmony’ in the poster of the 2009 National Putonghua Promotion Week (text reads: Harmony: 
Love the motherland language and script; build a harmonious language life) 
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a) hexie as an oversized word placed in the top-center, announcing the theme 
of the state-led language campaign, 
b) the same word as the background in the calligraphic font ‘seal’ (Zhuan, 
originated from the Confucian period over 2000 years ago) and written 
vertically – an aesthetically and archaically organization of semiotic 
indexicals of hexie’s historical and cultural roots – which frames the poster as 
well as, symbolically, the language campaign, and 
c) two sentences that spell out the updated (sociolinguistic) meaning of hexie 
in modern-day China: ‘love the motherland language and script; build a 
harmonious language life’. 
Government propaganda like this has been practised ever since the founding of the 
People’s Republic to install a monoglossic order in Chinese society.  This order is not 
only about which languages or language varieties are more prestigious than others, i.e. 
Putonghua compared to dialect or other languages, but also about the different and 
therefore unequal degrees of legitimacy and authenticity language as social capitals may 
have (or not) to afford people voice (e.g. Wang 2010). Regulation of language is 
regulation of voice, and thus a clear form of policing as formal policy. For Painter (2008) 
language facilitates the reproduction of the state, and is an instrument of national 
unification, standardization and mobilization, and therefore also an instrument of 
inclusion as well as exclusion, empowerment as well as violence. The first law of 
language in China, the Law on the Standard Spoken and Written Chinese issued in 2000, 
is a typical example, also a pretext of the ‘harmonious society’ discourse that followed a 
few years later. 
What we see in the above poster is that the state policing of a monoglossic order is being 
relabeled with hexie, an ideal that assumes order and normativity as appropriateness by 
virtue, and, as a result, becomes a bone fide voice. Such a voice is further sanctioned by 
the nationalist or patriotic sentiment (the call to love the motherland language and script) 
aroused by Confucianism from which hexie originates, and is seen symbolic of the 
Chinese history and culture (the use of the archaic style of harmony). Any voice implying 
an alternative, heteroglossic order is, hence, against harmony and inappropriate, and may 
be regarded as an act of subversion and sabotage. 
Sociolinguists in China (e.g. Feng 2006, 2007; Zhou 2006; Zhang 2009; Zhang & Xie 
2010) also argue that maintaining harmony or order of language use should be an 
indispensable aspect of constructing a harmonious society. They contend that, apart from 
official policy, the realization of language harmony relies on language users and their 
awareness of the norms of conduct and willingness and ‘sensibility’ in conforming to the 
norms (Feng & Zhang 2006). It is suggested by some that nonstandard, non-normative 
and creative uses of language in various domains, such as commercial language, literary 
works and online communication, all risk violating and harming linguistic and social 
harmony (Feng 2007). Following this line of argument, it can be said that harmony has to 
do as much with self-awareness of normalization as with top-down policing and active 
aggression of state power. 
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So far, we have discussed the notion of ‘harmony’ with respect to he, in its classical 
Confucian sense, and hexie, in its evolvement into the latest political discourse and 
reinvention of Confucianism emerging from China. Together, they provide important 
philosophical-epistemic as well as historical-cultural contextualization (Baumann & 
Briggs 1990; Silverstein & Urban 1996; Blommaert 2005) that enables us to dissect the 
meanings of harmony as observable texts and practices in China. These aspects 
contribute to the formation of harmony as an ideological imperative for rationalizing and 
policing the use of language as social resources in China, as a response to the rising 
social diversity and shifting social order instigated by the globalization processes there. 
This, in an era of the ‘network society’ (Castells 2009), gives rise to the powerful state 
Internet censorship apparatus in China.   
In the next section, we examine harmony as processes of policing in China’s virtual space. 
We will demonstrate that, alongside the state policing, there are considerable non-state-
oriented interactions and influences from grassroots users of the Internet. Such practices 
imply that ‘language harmony’ is not only about policies and legislations of language (as 
linguistic features) per se, but more about the policing of voice and the validity of using 
certain linguistic features to make oneself understood (Blommaert 2005). 
 
4. The (Dis)Harmonious Chinese Internet  
Recent development of the information and communication technologies in China has 
created the largest population of Internet users, or ‘netizens’, in the world, exceeding 500 
million in 2012 (compared to merely 60 million in 2002) based on the estimation of 
Wang Chen, chief of the Information Office of the State Council. The latest statistics 
from China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC), the government agency 
responsible for Internet affairs, suggest that the broadband penetration rate in China is 
now over 98%, and the average time spent by a Chinese netizen online is 2.6 hours a day. 
The sociopolitical implications of this are multifaceted regardless of the still unequal 
distribution of infrastructure and digital divide.  
Above all, the Internet has profoundly transformed the way people access information 
and communicate with one another. It offers unprecedented potential of freedom and 
democracy to an authoritarian state and exposes its citizens to alternative norms, values 
and ideas that were unavailable before. With the new technology, the speed and velocity 
of such changes are extraordinary, posing new challenges to the existing social order. 
One of the main challenges is related to ‘superdiversity’ (Vertovec 2006), new forms of 
diversity that use the Internet either as the space and medium of production, or as a tool 
for inventing new resources for meaning making (e.g. Varis & Wang 2011; Du & Kroon, 
forthcoming). What’s more, the Internet allows wider, more active and democratic 
participation to economic and sociopolitical discussions and public civic life, especially 
for the grassroots people (e.g. Zhou 2005; Yang 2009). In the case of China, all of these 
may interfere or even endanger the building of a harmonious society in the eyes of the 
state. Not only may online communication dispute the state prerogative of defining 
practices of meaning making, it also decreases the exclusive power of state control and 
opens various aspects of social and political issues for negotiation and debate. 
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4.1 Online Policing and Harmonization 
Structuring and maintaining virtual order is, therefore, on the top of the agenda for 
constructing, maintaining and reinforcing language harmony in China. Devising and 
implementing Internet censorship policies have been a vigorous and sometimes 
aggressive way of policing and controlling online behaviors (see Varis et al. 2010 for a 
discussion). For instance, in addition to rules on language use in general, such as the 
Language Law of 2000, it is common practice to use automatic screen-masking to block 
the use of ‘disharmonious’ language – ranging from profanity to politically sensitive 
words or topics – either substituting with asterisks or deleting them altogether. 
Sometimes an entire webpage or website is removed. The state also contrives a system 
that inflicts self-monitoring online. CNNIC has issued new legislation every year since 
1999 regarding the management of Internet Protocol address in order to accurately track 
the activities of individual end users online. The panoptic surveillance is conjointly 
carried out by the online police (see Figure 2) who inspect and enforce judicial 
punishment against disharmonious behaviors. The presence of law enforcement and 
policing online had of course started much earlier, in 2003 when the Ministry of Public 
Security put in operation the massive Golden Shield censorship project, known to many 
as the Great Firewall of China.  
 
 
Figure 2: Internet policing in China 
(source: www.techradar.com/news/internet/from-china-to-the-uk-net-censorship-worldwide-622428) 
 
 
In a blog entitled ‘25 Shocking Facts about Chinese Censorship’, Britney Wilkins lists all 
of the above and other measurements, including the use of spyware and the ban on 
transnational social networks such as Twitter, Youtube and Facebook, in order to censor 
and control what is happening on the Internet in China. Similarly, in a recent article 
entitled ‘Internet Censorship in China’, the New York Times points out that the Internet 
censorship in China is the most stringent in the world. More people are employed by the 
government to monitor and ‘guide’ online conducts, such as the notorious ‘50 Cents Party’ 
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(wumao dang 五毛党) who are allegedly paid at the rate of half a yuan per post to write 
in disguise as grassroots netizens, to steer public opinions into a ‘harmonious’ direction. 
When Christine Lagarde, the Managing Director of the IMF, decided to charm China by 
appearing on its most popular social media Sina Weibo during her official visit to China 
in November 2011, she was instantly cautioned by a netizen named Damo Duhang, 
‘Please be careful to write! Here is not France. If your word is sensitive, someone would 
hexie you.’ 
 
While the state doctrine of hexie shehui is used as a mandate to justify the tight control of 
communication and the quashing of potentially ‘disharmonious’ speech online, the word 
hexie has become over the years a satirical placeholder for ensuring stability and political 
status quo at all costs. The Chinese netizens started to use the word hexie as a euphemism 
for Internet censorship. When netizens say that a user has been ‘harmonized’, the 
suggestion is that the person has somehow been brought into compliance by government 
agency, whether by physical force or by losing access to his/her account. Through the 
appropriation of this word, they in fact voice criticism of governmental claims that 
censorship is employed to maintain a harmonious society. This attitude is illustrated in a 
widely circulated picture online (see Figure 3), which shows the word 和諧 (harmony) in 
traditional characters with the radical 口 (meaning ‘mouth’) in both characters being 
covered with plasters. Through this image, grassroots netizens argue that harmonization 
is in fact a policing strategy adopted by the authorities to silence their voices, to muzzle 
them. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: ‘harmony’ with no ‘mouth’ 
(source: http://webfee.blogspot.com/2011/10/blog-post_30.html) 
 
 
 
4.2 Hexie, River Crab and Grass Mud Horse 
The parodist appropriation of ‘harmony’ has, ironically, turned the word itself into a so-
called sensitive word, namely, an object of policing. When the word hexie got censored 
and ‘harmonized’ online, Chinese netizens creatively adopted the word ‘river crab’          
(河蟹) to replace the direct use of ‘harmony’ since the two words are homophones that 
are only tonologically different: héxié for ‘harmony’ and héxiè for ‘river crab’. Images of 
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river crabs (see e.g. Figure 4) are also circulated online to imply discontent with the state 
censorship and suppression of freedom of speech. In fact, ‘river crab’ has gradually 
become an Internet buzzword or meme that symbolizes, euphemistically, the ideological 
battling between ‘harmonization’ and ‘counter-harmonization’ in the Chinese cyberspace.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: hexie (river crab) on the national flag 
(source:https://blogs.commons.georgetown.edu/ln62-netspeak/author/ln62/) 
 
 
The move from héxié 和谐 to héxiè 河蟹 indicates an extraordinary effect of policing. 
Rather than uniformity and loss of voice, the enforcement of language harmony online 
has stimulated and facilitated new forms of (super)diversity and new opportunities to 
express self in alternative ways. This is important to our understanding of language 
policy as ethnographically informed process of policing. Even though harmony and 
Internet censorship are forcefully implemented as a top-down policy, this policy can be 
negotiated and resisted by the powerless group and by individual agency, and lead to 
oppositional responses and unexpected outcomes. To further illustrate this point, we turn 
to one of the most known Internet phenomena since 2009: a modern myth (Hopkins 
2009) about ‘river crab’ fighting ‘grass mud horse’ (another Internet meme created by 
netizens). In the story, ‘river crab’, euphemism of harmony as Internet policing, and 
‘grass mud horse’, homophone of a crude curse and poetic symbol of freedom of speech, 
enable netizens to figuratively enact struggles against state censorship through a fantasy 
drama of war woven in metaphors and puns, thus being ‘disharmonious’ without being 
‘harmonized’.  
 
‘Grass mud horse’ comes from căonímă (草泥马) in Chinese. It may look like a nonsense 
word, but it is the homophone (with different tones) of another Chinese expression, 
càonĭmā (肏你妈), which means ‘fuck your mother’. While the Chinese censorship 
system aims to block obscene uses of language, the phrase ‘grass mud horse’ actually 
allows netizens to transgress as well as to satirize the policy of censorship with impunity, 
which eventually makes the word an icon of grassroots aspirations for freedom of speech. 
They even invented a written form for this three-character-phrase, by combining part of 
each of the three characters 草,泥 and 马 (see Figure 5). As a netizen named Kenneth Tan 
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explains, ‘The 艹 radical refers to ‘grass’ (草), 尼 resembles 泥 and both are 
homophones, while 马 is the character for ‘horse’. The new character even has a 
recommended pronunciation jiayu’2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: ‘grass mud horse’: a new Chinese character 
(source: http://shanghaiist.com/2009/03/23/character_of_the_day.php) 
 
 
In the beginning, the invention of ‘grass mud horse’ became popularized among the 
Chinese netizens only as a clever euphemism of a swearing word that can escape the 
touch of harmonization. But gradually, caonima took on a whole new life beyond this 
function. A mythical animal depicted as a furry, amiable-looking alpaca was created to 
give a physical embodiment of caonima, a previously nonexistent creature, and started 
roaming on the Internet. Then, a story was invented about the grass mud horse, which 
tells that the magical beast lives in a desert ‘Mahler Gobi’ (malegebi 马勒戈壁) and 
feeds on ‘fertile grass’ (wocao 沃草). Although the environment in Mahler Gobi desert is 
extremely harsh, the grass mud horse lives a happy life there. But one day, the river crab 
moves into Mahler Gobi. The grass mud horse and the river crab have a fierce fight and, 
finally, the grass mud horse wins the battle (see Figure 6) and goes on living in the 
fantasy land of Mahler Gobi desert thereafter.  
 
 
Figure 6: ‘grass mud horse’ swallowing ‘river crab’ 
                                                          
2 http://shanghaiist.com/2009/03/23/character_of_the_day.php, viewed on 9 April 2012.  
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The story (with several slightly varied versions) is a dramatic elaboration of resistance 
against Internet policing by grassroots netizens in China, in which the protagonist, the 
grass mud horse, represents the repressed and the river crab represents the repressor.  The 
use of stories becomes here the ‘hidden transcript’ (Scott 1990) of public political 
discourse, by developing euphemistic lexicons, images and narratives through which 
language use and meanings are coded in such a way that they are recognized and shared 
by subordinate groups, but lie beyond the patrol and surveillance of the authority. Both 
‘Mahler Gobi’ and ‘fertile grass’ are such examples: the former is the homophone of the 
Chinese vulgar expression malegebi 妈了个屄 (your mother’s vagina), and the latter is 
that of wocao 我肏 (I fuck). In using extreme profanity, subversive puns as well as the 
metaphorical plot of the grass mud horse defeating the river crab, netizens are able to 
utter deep resentment and symbolic defiance of China’s Internet censorship. This triumph 
was celebrated across the Internet and spawned reproductions in more vivid forms of 
language by using Internet technology.  
 
One such example is an online music video called ‘the Song of the Grass Mud Horse’ 
that went viral (available now even on Youtube) after its release in 2009. The song (again 
with a number of versions) features a digital voice of children’s chorus singing about the 
life of the grass mud horse in the theme tune of the famous children’s cartoon television 
series The Smurfs, as if to highlight the cuddly creature’s unambiguous decency, 
innocence and vitality. Its lyrics go like this
3
: 
 
In the remote but beautiful Mahler Gobi desert 
There is a group called the grass mud horse 
They are lively and smart 
They are cheeky and sensitive 
They live freely on Mahler Gobi desert 
They are strong and brave in overcoming harsh conditions  
Oh excellent grass mud horse 
Oh superb grass mud horse 
They defeated the river crab to save fertile grass(land) 
The river crab disappeared from Mahler Gobi desert forever 
 
The infectiously funny yet perplexingly distorted presentations intertwined with digital 
productions like this suggest powerful yet humorous attacks against the normalization 
force online. The narrative about caonima as feisty survivors and warriors who fight 
bravely against invaders to protect their scarce resources is, in fact, a hidden political 
dissent and activism through language violence against harmony-as-hegemony. This kind 
of struggle extends even beyond the Internet, as the image of caonima goes offline, enters 
people’s everyday life and is turned into consumable goods and identity statements in 
popular culture (see Figure 7).  
 
                                                          
3 See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=01RPek5uAJ4, Translation is our own.  
18 
 
 
 
Figure 7: caonima T-shirt and toys 
 
 
Not only has caonima been transformed into a new cultural product of online spoofs 
(Meng 2011) and symbolic interactions (Wang 2012) for mass consumption, it goes on to 
expand deeper into Chinese society and becomes an exploitable material with multiple 
meanings that inspires and provokes more explicitly ‘disharmonious’ democratic 
movement, especially by public intellectuals. The Chinese artist and dissident Ai Weiwei 
makes himself a leading actor of such movement by posting on his website and 
blogsphere photo images of himself posing naked with only a small furry caonima doll 
blocking or ‘harmonizing’ his privates. This is highly controversial not least because of 
the public display of nudity (which later led to criminal accusations of ‘pornography’ 
against Ai Weiwei): the composition of these images comes with a highly offensive 
caption which rests on the pun between ‘grass mud horse covering the middle’ (căonímă 
dăngzhōngyāng 草泥马挡中央) and ‘fuck your mother the Central Party’ (caonima 
dăngzhōngyāng 肏你妈党中央). This visual and semiotic reframing of caonima 
broadens further the sociolinguistic repertoire of the word and makes it a transparent 
symbol of ridicule and contempt over the control of online communication imposed from 
the above (as depicted in a cartoon impression of Ai Weiwei’s act of art by the Chicago 
artist Tom Tian, see Figure 8).  
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Figure 8: Ai Weiwei with caonima 
(source: http://www.tomtian.com/#s=2&mi=2&pt=1&pi=10000&p=4&a=0&at=0) 
 
 
As Hopkins (2011) observes,  
 
‘The image both celebrates the grass mud horse’s symbolic status as a champion of 
natural human freedom and evokes the constraints of censorship, as the artist protects 
himself from full exposure by using the grass mud horse as both a black bar and a 
perversely exaggerated phallus. Much like the phrase “grass mud horse”, Ai’s alpaca 
doll announces what it obscures by replacing the unmentionable with a hysterical, 
unavoidable substitute’.  
 
By leaping over the heads of the police, a naked Ai Weiwei, with one hand shielding 
himself with the grass mud horse and the other raised in a fist high in the air, shows 
ultimate condemnation, rebellion and subversion against the hegemony of policing 
exercised by the authority.  
 
4.3 Discussion  
From hexie to caonima, what we have is a complex story about harmony and 
harmonization, Internet censorship, hegemony and suppression, resistance and struggle, 
semiotic innovation and digital creativity from Chinese cyberspace (see Nie 2009 for a 
discussion). In the name of traditionalism and nationalism represented (selectively) by the 
Confucian idea of harmony, the state is keenly restructuring order and rebalancing social 
disparity while maintaining the authoritarian system. This ambition of harmony 
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inevitably leads to the ‘harmonization’, i.e. coercion and even denial, of diversity and 
voice, which are only enhanced by the Internet as a new social arena and new package of 
resources for constructing alternative identities. The Chinese Internet censorship is a new 
and overt form of policing in response to this phenomenon of globalization. Nevertheless, 
it is challenged from below.  
The above discussions illustrate how innovative manipulation of the linguistic, semiotic 
and literacy resources via computer-mediated communication creates a new genre of 
protest and contention through which the process of state policing is sabotaged and 
disputed. The invention of ‘river crab’ and ‘grass mud horse’, together with their 
associative lexicons, puns and jokes, relies on the sophisticated interplay of visual, verbal 
and symbolic texts that is able to express multiple meanings through the same form. This 
transformation of language function is made possible by the Internet technology and 
propagated and transmitted from online to offline, making these words a socially 
recognizable and enregistered set of codes that offer linguistic, aesthetic, symbolic and 
political capitals, thus allowing Chinese netizens to develop their own voice in the 
presence of tough policy.  
Subversive Internet memes like the ones examined here are an important and distinctive 
part of micro-politics in China that ‘takes advantage of unique possibilities of the Chinese 
language, as well as the technological possibilities of the Internet’ (Hopkins 2009). 
Although memes tend to be contingent, unstable and temporary – also depending on the 
extent of policing – their instant usability and trendiness can appeal to mass audiences, 
and can therefore potentially generate mass campaigns against censorship (or other forms 
of) policing through fast, informal, micro language transgression. The word hexie offers a 
good example of how ‘harmony’ is turned on its own head and changed from a symbol of 
policing and homogenization to that of contention and counter-homogenization, totally 
opposite to what it was intended to mean by the official. Moreover, it spawns a string of 
new memes, all of which are developed into codes with multiple functions that can be 
used and appropriated in a range of settings and environments as anti-policing 
instruments.   
Ironically, in the process of harmonization, ‘harmony’ has caused considerable 
‘disharmonious’ behaviour and noise. In the context of globalization, such politics of 
(dis)harmony on the Internet can be taken as an indication of the diversification of voices 
and thus superdiversity. Nevertheless, what seems a semiotic carnival that draws wide 
participation in a range of formats cannot really escape the control and inhibition of the 
state power. According to Global Voices (a multilingual community of bloggers who 
report about citizen media stories from around the world), as a consequence of over-
popularity, the online appearance of the legendary Chinese Internet memes hexie and 
caonima is officially suspended. They reported that a notification to the Chinese forum 
managers is repeatedly tweeted about the banishing of these words
4
:  
                                                          
4 China: Goodbye Grass Mud Horse. See http://globalvoicesonline.org/2009/03/18/china-goodbye-
grass-mud-horse/, viewed on 9 April 2012.  
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The hands of policing seem omnipresent, but so do phenomena of hexie and caonima. 
The banality of power (Mbembe 1992) in the name of harmony already presupposes the 
existence of disharmony. The question to ask, then, is ‘not whether the Internet will 
democratize China, but rather in what ways the Internet is democratizing (or will 
democratize) communication in China’ (Tai 2006:184).  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper has reviewed the genesis of ‘harmony’, a political term at the level of policy 
in China from its early philosophical sources to its contemporary deployment as a notable 
concept of social order. Harmony, as we have seen, has never been an unambiguous 
concept and has always been contested, remodelled and challenged, by means of shifts in 
the intertextual links of the concept. In this sense, harmony joins the ranks of political 
core terms such as ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’, ‘development’ and so forth: semantic floaters 
that, when used skilfully, can stand for entirely different realities in ways already 
described by Dwight Bolinger (1971). As Bolinger argued, the ‘pure’ or ‘original’ 
semantics of a term can never stand for the total array of its actual forms of usage. Word 
meanings, in short, are poor indicators of the actual life of words in human social and 
cultural practice. 
We are now in a position to formulate some conclusions, and two sets of reflections need 
to be addressed. First, we want to extract some general points from our case analysis and 
look at what this analysis tells us about harmony as larger patterns of political and 
ideological struggle. Second, some general observations can be made regarding the 
nature of language policy and the ways of investigating this. Let us begin with the first 
set of reflections. 
We have seen that the intensive use of the term ‘harmony’ in contemporary China is 
guided by a desire, or demand, for social order. This demand appears to be spurred by the 
accelerating social differentiation in the People’s Republic in the wake of its rise to 
global economic prominence. With the emergence of a sizeable professional middle class 
and a smaller nevertheless important class of super-rich people (e.g. Tomba 2009), China 
is rapidly becoming a class-stratified society characterized by growing differences 
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between rich and poor. This is accompanied by the availability of new information and 
ideas and new opportunities and resources for identity making provided by the Internet.  
It is in the context of such an escalating social and political divide and ramification that 
‘harmony’ must be seen and understood.  It is a slogan that responds to the rapid 
fragmentation and diversification in society by putting some ‘spin’ on it – in spite of such 
growing diversities, the Chinese must have a common focus and invest themselves in a 
project of social cohesion and ‘harmony’. This concern with ‘harmony’ is thus an attempt 
towards re-emphasizing the modernist monocentric ideal inscribed in the state structure 
of China. Harmony should produce, legitimatize and enforce centripetal forces in society 
and politics, and prevent society from spinning out of control. 
This, as we have seen, does not always work according to plan. The monocentric 
orientation of ‘harmony’ clashes with the increasing polycentricity in Chinese society, 
where we see an increasing social, cultural and political fragmentation – that is, an 
increasing divergence of values, opinions, modes of analysis and other objects of what is 
traditionally called ‘ideology’. The Internet is a carrier for such accelerating forms of 
polycentricity, and we have shown some of the many ways in which Chinese netizens 
address in practice the state’s and their own understandings of harmony. Obviously, the 
Internet is a platform not just for centripetal forces in society but also (and perhaps even 
more so) for centrifugal forces, forces that take subjects out of the monocentric orbit of 
the state. This tension between a centripetal and monocentric social politics, and a 
centrifugal and polycentric potential offered by the Internet, is well understood by the 
Chinese authorities, and could be at the core of the state’s attempts to monitor and 
constrain Internet use. Similar reactions against the ‘chaotic’ dimensions of the Internet 
by the state can be observed elsewhere too – think of the knee-jerk reactions by several 
Western states when Wikileaks started publishing previously confidential documents. 
The future of ‘harmony’ as a useful concept in Chinese politics will depend on the way in 
which it can be deployed as a ‘niched’, non-totalizing concept targeted perhaps at the 
policing and regulation of certain aspects of social life. If it is applied to the totality of 
social life, it will backfire, because it is an entirely inadequate descriptor of social 
processes and, consequently, can only be used against specific social processes, as a 
means to repress and eliminate certain forms of social processes. That is, it can only be 
used successfully as a potentially repressive policing instrument. It will then share the 
fate of many other concepts deployed by central authorities in attempts to ‘control’ and 
‘reduce’ escalating social diversity. ‘Integration’, ‘social stability’, ‘social cohesion’ and 
other widely used terms will almost inevitably become (or have already become) targets 
of contestation and conflict, since they are irrelevant as descriptors of the social realities 
(cf. Blommaert & Verschueren 1998). A monocentric understanding of legitimate 
identities, identities that come with important material and immaterial entitlements, is 
likely to lead to coercive and excluding practices in the age of globalization and 
superdiversity. 
So how do we understand language policy in view of the evidence presented here? It is 
clear that language policy, any language policy, is not a singular object, the features of 
which can simply be ‘read off’ core documents in a semantic analysis of the core terms in 
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the language-political vocabulary. It is best to see it as a highly complex and nonlinear set 
of practices that are lodged in specific sociolinguistic contexts. The forces that create 
language-political effects are not unified either, perhaps not even readily identifiable or 
entirely unpredictable, as can be seen in our case of online harmonization. A more 
ethnographically-based analysis would bring out the specific factors influencing the 
direction of these processes, and show us why sometimes coercion will prevail, and why 
sometimes resistance and transformation occur.  
It is also unwise to see language-political statements and key terms as descriptors of 
sociolinguistic realities. This ‘fallacy of internalism’ (Thompson 1990) assumes that 
political realities are contained in political texts, an assumption that has inspired many 
scholars in language policy. Texts and terms, however, do not predict their own uptake 
and implementation. In fact, uptake and implementation are fields of research in their 
own right and require entirely different approaches than the critical textual analysis of 
language policies. They demand ethnographic inspection, and when such ethnographic 
inspection is performed, researchers will often encounter unexpected outcomes (cf. 
McCarty 2011). We can then see formal language policies – texts and their concepts – as 
flexible and unstable instruments.  They may be designed for dogmatic deployment but in 
reality, they receive defiant interpretations and adverse consequences, as illustrated in 
this paper. We can also see formal language policies as just one instrument for shaping 
the sociolinguistic lives of people, though this rarely occurs as the only instrument. 
Societies and their sociolinguistic environments are polycentric and become increasingly 
so. Language policies such as that of harmony will therefore have to share their space of 
manoeuvering with other sets of prescriptions and normative expectations.  
 
------------- 
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